Creative Problem Solving and the Castro Conundrum by Cooper, James M.
CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING AND THE
CASTRO CONUNDRUM
JAMES M. COOPER*
When Pope John Paul II set foot on the tarmac of Jos6 Martf Interna-
tional Airport in Havana on January 21, 1998, he showed that constructive
engagement and dialogue does bring rapid change--even amidst the ideo-
logical remnants held over from the Cold War. The Pontiff's first words to
both Cuba and the world were prophetic: "May Cuba, with all its magnifi-
cent potential, open itself up to the world, and may the world open itself to
Cuba."' As the Pontiff spoke, Cuban President Fidel Castro, wearing a busi-
ness suit in lieu of his traditional military fatigues, stood respectfully at his
side.'
Given a paid holiday, Cubans lined the streets of Havana to cheer the
Papal convoy as it passed. Posters and murals of the Pope lined the walls of
the streets alongside portraits of fallen Argentine guerrilla leader and Cuban
hero Chd Guevara! Among many Cubans, there was a sense of great hope
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1. Mark Fineman & Richard Boudreaux, Catholics, Communists Join to Welcome
Pope, L.A. TiMEs, Jan. 22, 1998, at Al.
2. In his youth, Castro was fascinated with the Bible. As a student at B6len College, an
exclusive Jesuit preparatory school in the outskirts of Havana, the future Cuban leader
would begin his love-hate relationship with Catholicism. In a 1961 speech, Castro ex-
plained: "I was formed in the midst of the worst reaction and I lost many years of my life
in obscurantism, superstition and lies." See TAD SzuLc, FIDEL: A CRITICAL PORTRAIT 123
(1986). See also GEORGIE ANNE GEYER, GUERRILLA PRINCE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF FIDEL
CAsTRo 31 (1991).
3. Ch6 (Ernesto Guevara de la Serna) himself returned to Cuba only a few months ear-
lier. After months of digging, a team of Argentine forensic anthropologists found Gue-
vara's remains under an abandoned airstrip in Vallegrande, Bolivia, where he was killed in
1967 attempting to lead a peasant revolution. See John Otis, The Resurrection of Che, TH
MIAMI HERALD: TROPIC, Apr. 14, 1996, at 12.
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about the Pontiff s trip: Would it lead to further religious and political free-
doms? Would it lead to an easing of the American economic boycott against
Cuba?
The Pope did not let the Cuban people down. In public appearances
throughout his tour of the Communist island, the Polish Pontiff urged the
Cuban authorities to release political prisoners and foster civil liberties like
the freedom of expression and association. The open exchange of ideas had
begun. It was not that long ago, however, that Catholicism had been ban-
ished from Cuba and its proponents exiled. Now, the Pope's homilies were
televised live on Cubavision, Cuba's State Television channel, and were co-
anchored by Father Pedro Freites, a Vatican Radio official.4
Such an opening in relations between Havana and the Vatican has not
occurred by accident, nor has the newfound freedom of religious practice for
Cubans. There is something to be said about this approach to constructive
dialogue--even for parties that are, by their very nature, ideology, and ac-
tions, adversaries. The Vatican's flexible and open approach to discourse
with Havana has, indeed, begun to show some tangible results.
The same cannot be said for the United States government's policy to-
wards Cuba. Instead of being open to dialogue and some form of construc-
tive discourse, U.S. policy towards the Communist island nation has virtu-
ally shut down all options for engagement. The U.S. economic embargo
against Cuba not only continues in force, but has grown even stronger. With
the passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act
of 1995,' also known as the Helms-Burton Act, the 35-year-old embargo
was no longer a flexible Presidential Order, but was chiseled into U.S. law.
The very premise of the Helms-Burton Act is to bring down the Castro
regime in Cuba. The statute states that, only by removing Cuban leader Fi-
del Castro and his brother Radil and dismantling the Communist regime, can
the U.S. government end the embargo. The Act further tightens the embargo
against Cuba by punishing foreign companies that do business in Cuba.
However, this statute extends U.S. law outside American jurisdiction.
Under international law, a State has free reign to impose laws governing all
events within its own sovereign borders, but it may not reach outside of the
confines of its territory and impose its will on those subjects not validly un-
der its jurisdiction. The Helms-Burton Act does just that. It proscribes cer-
tain behavior of foreign companies that legally undertake business with
Cuba. The European Union ("EU"), backed by Canada, Mexico, and almost
all other countries in the 132-member World Trade Organization ("WTO"),
has argued that the Helms-Burton Act violates open trade rules by extending
U.S. jurisdictional reach outside its national territory. Canada and Mexico
4. Mark Fineman, Surprise Two and One Half Hour State-Run Telecast Lets Whole
Nation See Papal Mass, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at Al.
5. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (1997).
6. The dispute has been temporarily suspended pending a negotiated settlement be-
tween the European Union and the U.S. government. See infra, sec. II. B. 1.
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have argued that the Helms-Burton Act violates the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").7
The Helms-Burton Act does not just violate international law.' The Act
is also bad for trade liberalization, bad for international law, and ultimately
bad for United States foreign relations. Most trading partners of the United
States have enacted "blocking statutes" that prohibit their companies and
citizens from complying with the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act.' In
addition to alienating America's trading partners, the Helms-Burton Act has
exposed and played upon the weaknesses in a number of international and
regional institutions. The headstrong legislative actions of the United States
have breached the fundamental tenets of the international trade system and
the United Nations. As a leading member of the global economy, Washing-
ton has pushed continually for the liberalization of trade around the world,
yet this Act does just the opposite.
That the economic embargo against Cuba continues in force is, in and
of itself, a breach of common sense. American companies continue to lose
business as a result of extraterritorial measures such as the Helms-Burton
Act."0 Moreover, U.S. policy towards Cuba appears hypocritical in light of
the economic relief that the Cuban exile communities in Florida and New
Jersey send to Cuba. The punishing sanctions against the island nation have
also caused considerable suffering among the Cuban people. Not surpris-
ingly, the Pope met with reporters on the airplane voyage to Havana to state
that he wanted the U.S. to change its 35-year-old embargo against Cuba. He
also repeated this challenge during his historic visit."
7. North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 (pts. 1-3), 605 (pts. 4-8 &
annexes) (1993) (effective Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
8. The leading scholarship exploring the weaknesses of the Helms-Burton Act comes
from Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419 (1996). For a more generalized critique of the
U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, see Shari-Ellen Bourque, Note, The Illegality of the Cu-
ban Embargo in the Current International System, 13 B.U. LNT'L L.J. 191 (1995). Most
American commentators point to the Helms-Burton Act as a violation of international law.
See Anthony M. Solis, Comment, The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act, 19
Loy. L.A. INr'L & COMP. L.J. 709, 740 (1997) ("The Helms-Burton Act is bad law.").
Some American commentators have seen the Helms-Burton Act in a more positive vein:
Brice M. Claggett, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act-A Reply to Professor Lowenfeld, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 641 (1996). A more detailed ex-
amination of Title IV of the Act can be found in Craig R. Auge, Title IV of the Helms-
Burton Act, Continued: A Questionable Secondary Boycott, 28 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
575 (1997). For a more detailed examination of Title m, see Susan J. Long, A Challenge to
the Legality of Title III of Libertad and an International Response, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 467 (1997).
9. Canada: Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act Incorporating the Amendments
Countering the U.S. Helms-Burton Act, 36 I.L.M. 111 (1997). See also infra notes 59, 63,
89.
10. European-American Business Council, Is the Price Too High? The Cost of U.S.
Sanctions (Oct. 1997) <http://www.eabc.org/study.htm>.
11. Pope John Paul 11 Arrived in Cuba After Urging the U.S. to Soften its Embargo,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1998, at Al.
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But the Pope's mission to Cuba was a double-edged sword. Like the
U.S. government, the Pope wants to see more political freedom and funda-
mental human rights protection from the 39-year-old Communist regime.
One target for criticism is the one-party rule that has been the mainstay of
Cuban politics since the Revolution. During his flight to Havana, the Pontiff
told journalists, "You know very well I am thinking of human rights and
what I can say to guarantee them."" Throughout his visit, the Pope made
good on his word, prodding the regime in Havana to change its oppressive
ways. In a message aimed at Cuba's monolithic Communist Party, the Pon-
tiff told a crowd of 200,000 people in the capital's Revolution Square that,
"[flor many of the political and economic systems operative today, the
greatest challenge is still that of combining freedom and social justice."' 3
The crowd responded by chanting uniformly, "Freedom, freedom, freedom,"
much to the horror of Communist Party officials.
Such a tone was to be expected. Indeed, the Pope had described his trip
as an "apostolic journey," one capable of initiating change. Taking on
Communist regimes for not protecting fundamental freedoms is nothing new
to the Pope. From standing up for the outlawed Solidarity movement in the
midst of Poland's crackdown under Marshall law to criticizing openly the
Sandanista regime during a Papal visit to Nicaragua, the Pope's anti-
Communist credentials speak volumes. Many credit the Pontiff's interven-
tion in Eastern Europe in the 1980s as the force that brought down the Iron
Curtain without mass violence.
Such missionary fervor, however, is not the only key to unlocking the
people of Cuba. For example, in Eastern Europe, economic links and diplo-
matic dialogue sparked a positive change in social discourse, leading to new
historic openings. America was there in the 1980s to encourage that change
through a number of proactive mechanisms, including cultural exchanges,
political dialogue, and trade. The same must be the case for Cuba. New ap-
proaches and fresh ideas must be imported into what is an increasingly en-
trenched position-the Castro conundrum. The hard-line policy of the
American government towards Cuba must be reevaluated in light of chang-
ing circumstances, and creative approaches to solving the diplomatic prob-
lem between Washington and Havana must be applied.
This Essay will examine how the United States' hard-line policy has
failed to bring about positive developments in Cuba. Part I of this Essay ex-
plores the United States' relationship with Cuba and, in particular, how con-
secutive American administrations have continued to put economic and po-
litical pressure on Havana with few results. Close to 40 years after the
Communist Revolution, Castro and his Communist Party still control Cuba.
Part I then reviews the Helms-Burton Act as the final and most permanent
12. Americas: One Small Chink in Cuba's Prison Doors, THE EcoNoMIST, Feb. 21,
1998, at 33.
13. Pascal Fletcher & Henry Hamman, Pope Issues Appeal for Reconciliation, FIN.
TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1998, at 6.
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component of U.S. policy towards Cuba. Part II of this Essay examines the
substantive implications of the Helms-Burton Act and why the international
community and America's trading partners have taken Washington to task.
Part III proposes alternative approaches to the American-Cuban situation,
using an evolving process of Creative Problem Solving. This Essay con-
cludes with a call for more flexible solutions to the Castro conundrum and
puts forward an agenda for future discourse.
I. CLOSING THE GRIP: THE UNITED STATES' EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
A. The History of the Embargo
Shortly after Fidel Castro and his July 26th Movement came to power
in January 1959 after a long guerrilla campaign against the U.S.-supported
regime of Fulgencio Batista, relations with the United States soured. Wash-
ington had long viewed Cuba as a quasi-protectorate, if not a compliant sup-
plier of a primary resource-sugar. As Cuba's new leader, Castro courted
the Soviet Union. 4 Several members of the Cuban Communist Party took
positions in his new revolutionary government, while Cuban sugar was
traded for oil from the Soviet Union. Moscow also provided trade credits,
technical assistance, and a supply of crude and refined petroleum.
The American government was not happy. A series of actions and reac-
tions further worsened relations between Washington and Havana. On July
6, 1960, the U.S. eliminated Cuba's sugar quota when U.S. President
Dwight Eisenhower issued the Determination of Cuban Sugar Quota Proc-
lamation. 5 The Cuban government responded by amending its national laws
to allow for the nationalization of American properties located in Cuba. The
nationalization of the Texaco oil refinery became a harbinger of things to
come. Texaco refused to refine oil received from the Soviet Union, and the
Cuban government confiscated all of the company's assets located on the
island, eventually also taking over the assets of Esso and Shell.
The U.S. government demanded that the Castro regime pay adequate
compensation for all expropriated U.S. properties, and relations between the
two States continued to deteriorate. In October 1960, the U.S. instituted an
economic embargo banning the exportation of American goods to Cuba. The
embargo included exceptions for medicines and some foodstuffs. In Febru-
ary 1962, pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Trading with the
Enemy Act, President Kennedy proclaimed an embargo on all trade with
Cuba.'6 Even before Castro announced that his Revolution was Communist,
U.S. economic involvement on the island fell. Imports from the U.S. were
14. See SzuLc, supra note 2, at 562-87.
15. Proclamation No. 3356, reprinted in 7 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988), and in 74 Stat. C72
(1960).
16. Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2370
(1994).
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reduced from $543 million in 1959 to $224 million a year later. 7
Cuba was immediately affected by the U.S. embargo and attempted to
mitigate its damages by beginning trade with Soviet bloc States. In essence,
the Cuban government merely traded one imperial economic partner for an-
other. By 1989, economic relations with the Soviet Union represented 70
percent of Cuba's trade. 8 This "special relationship" with the Soviet Union
and the socialist international trading system managed to shield the Cuban
economy from the macroeconomic shocks that hit much of Latin America
by the early 1980s. Between 1982 and 1985, as the rest of Latin America
suffered with less than one percent annual growth, the Cuban economy en-
joyed a 5.1 percent growth rate. 9 This growth did not occur without cost to
Cuba, however, as Soviet subsidies amounted to about 22 percent of Cuban
disposable income between 1980 and 1987.20
This well of subsidies ran dry with the collapse of the Soviet Union. By
1992, trade subsidies from the Soviet Union ended, with Cuba since suffer-
ing a period of plummeting prosperity.2 While the Cuban revolution had
been successful at attaining high standards in health and education, the Cu-
ban economy is just as dependent on outside trade as it was when the regime
of Fulgencio Batista fell on New Year's Day 1959. Sugar has remained king
of the Cuban economy. Between 1984 and 1989, 77 percent of Cuba's ex-
ports were attributable to sugar.
The strategy of import substitution is a dismal failure. The island's
factories operate at only 30 percent capacity, with shortages being the norm.
The need for American parts and the lack of Soviet replacements have been
problems for over three decades. Food shortages have become common as
imports have been seriously reduced to assist in the State's foreign exchange
deficit. The average Cuban now gets below the recommended World Health
Organization number of daily calories under the State food rationing pro-
gram. Imported capital goods and intermediate goods, like oil, have become
even more scarce, and black markets for food are more prevalent. Record-
low sugar harvests have added to the problems. Jobs have been cut, with un-
17. SUSAN SCHROEDER, CUBA: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL STATISTICS 433 (1982).
18. Garry Evans, A Way Out of the Wilderness, EUROMONEY, July 1992, at 40.
19. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (Washington, D.C.
1987), and CUBAN MINISTRY OF INFORMATION REPORT, ANUARIO ESTADISTICO DE CUBA
(1989).
20. See A.R.M. Ritter, The Cuban Economy in the 1990s: External Challenges and
Policy Imperatives, 32 J. OF INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 117-49 (1990), and An-
drew Zimbalist, Teetering on the Brink: Cuba's Post-CMEA Economic and Political Crisis,
24 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 407-18 (1992).
21. In a recent interview, Cuba's Central Bank President Francisco Sober6n claimed
that this perpetual economic slump had ended. Sober6n claimed that Cuba's Gross Domes-
tic Product ("GDP") grew by 2.5 percent in 1997, a "disappointment" in comparison with
1996's growth of 7.8 percent. The official estimate for GDP growth in 1998 is a modest 2.5
to 3.5 percent. See Pascal Fletcher, Centrally Planned and Proud of It, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1998, at 5. With the demise of centrally planned economies and the proven destructive na-
ture of command economics, many economists would see these figures merely as fanciful
propaganda.
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2 [1998], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol28/iss2/5
1998] CRATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING AND THE CASTRO CONUNDRUM 397
employment rising rapidly. Prostitution, catering to foreign tourists, has
been on the rise. In short, the Cuban economy is on the brink of disaster.
Castro calls it Cuba's "special period."
In 1992, Castro put all hopes for resuscitating the economy of his strug-
gling country on the encouragement of foreign investment. A cacophony of
Canadian, European, and Mexican business people have taken Castro at his
word and invested with him in the island's future. Drawn by pent-up de-
mand, a highly educated workforce, and a commitment to economic reform,
these entrepreneurs have put money into Cuba's strategic industries-
telecommunications, oil exploration, and resources mining. Tourism has be-
come a growth industry, as Canadian, German, and Spanish concerns have
opened for business across the island. By late 1994, over 150 foreign coun-
try-Cuban joint ventures, comprising over $1.5 billion in value, have been
created. The only State left out of this entrepreneurial bonanza has been the
United States. And this is a compelling factor drawing foreign companies to
invest in Cuba-there is no American competition.
The U.S. has by no means been inactive concerning Cuba. Instead of
engaging Cuba through economic links to foster political change, the U.S.
State Department has worked to punish the foreign companies that conduct
business with the Castro regime. Recent history in Eastern Europe has dem-
onstrated the potential for political change that dialogue and trade can fa-
cilitate. But when it comes to Cuba, the Cold War is as hot as ever. For over
thirty years, the economic embargo against Cuba has remained in force, each
presidential administration, save the Carter era, doing more to strengthen it.
But Castro's regime has survived eight U.S. presidencies. The embargo has
crippled Cuba, but still the Castro regime remains in power. Washington
understood that something had to be done to strengthen the embargo and in-
crease its reach. Extraterritorial measures were necessary.
In 1983, the Reagan administration was only too ready to engage in
such measures, even if it meant alienating its North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation ("NATO") allies. The economic embargo was further strengthened
during the Bush administration. In 1992, President George Bush ordered an
amendment to China's "Most Favored Nation" status contingent on China's
reduction of assistance to Cuba. President Bush then backed a bill that fur-
ther solidified the embargo, and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 ("the
Torricelli Act") was signed into law during the 1992 Presidential campaign."
President Bush, anxious to leverage his anti-Communist credentials, chose
to sign the bill into law during a ceremony in the Cuban-American commu-
nity in Miami. The Torricelli Act extended the reach of the embargo against
Cuba through the use of sanctions. It was intended to "encourage" the Cu-
ban government to begin a transition to democratic governance, by imposing
severe penalties on U.S. subsidiaries operating in third countries that trade
22. The Act was first proposed by Congressman Robert Torricelli in 1988 and became
law some four years later. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (Supp. IV 1992). For President Bush's
speech, see 28 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2071 (Oct. 23, 1992).
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with Cuba. Section 1708 of the Act states that Cuba can regain American-
based assistance by implementing "free and fair elections for a new govern-
ment."
Section 1704 of the Torricelli Act allows the President to apply sanc-
tions against any country that trades with Cuba. Section 1706 of the Act
provides for an even more restrictive application of the embargo that was
already in place. 3 Vessels previously docked in Cuba were to be severely
limited in the ability to dock in the U.S. subsequently. A waiting period of
180 days had to follow, thereby limiting the ability of third parties to con-
duct trade with both Cuba and the United States and to take advantage of
such geographical proximity for delivery of goods.24
The international response to this Act was swift--Cuba's trading part-
ners were not impressed. But that did not stop elements in Congress from
playing the Cuba card and further angering America's trading partners.
North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms built on the embargo where the Tor-
ricelli Act had left off. The Republican Senator, along with Indiana Con-
gressman Dan Burton, sponsored the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Soli-
darity (Libertad) Act of 1995, better known as the Helms-Burton Act,
legislation so ridiculous in nature that it looked like it would languish in
Congress as a hangover from the Cold War. Senator Helms forthrightly ex-
plained the Act's intention: "Let me be clear. Whether Castro leaves Cuba in
a vertical or horizontal position is up to him and the Cuban people. But he
must and will leave Cuba.
26
With such Cold War rhetoric, it was no surprise that for two years the
Helms-Burton Act was not seriously considered, let alone adopted. Under
the newly installed Clinton administration, relations between Washington
and Havana saw some progress. Attempting to break with the Cold War
mentality of the past, the new White House refused to be hamstrung by his-
tory. Knee-jerk reactions would be a thing of the past. Instead, dialogue and
engagement ensued. President Clinton's policy regarding Cuba was termed
"calibrated response." Washington responded proportionately to Cuban re-
forms; small shifts in Havana's policies were to be met with small shifts in
U.S. policy towards Cuba.
In the summer of 1994, such ripples turned into waves-waves of Cu-
ban refugees. Over fifty thousand balseros (rafters) fled the Communist is-
land in search of a better life in the United States, or at least a decent meal.7
Hostility to the regime had been increasing, as had open defiance towards
the Communist Party's rule. Cuba's leader needed a safety valve to relieve
the pressures that a broken economy and an increasingly frustrated and hun-
gry people could bring to bear on his regime. Castro had used the boatlift
23. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1997).
24. Id. § 6005 (b)(1).
25. Id. §§ 6021-6091.
26. Kevin Fedarko, Open for Business, TIME, Feb. 20, 1995, at 39.
27. See George J. Church, Cubans, Go Home, TiME, Sept. 5, 1994, at 28.
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from the Cuban port of Mariel in 1980 to rid his island of its dissidents and
criminals, as some 125,000 Cubans sought refuge on U.S. shores, an un-
mitigated success for the Cuban government. Again, he let his people flee to
the United States, this time on even more make-shift flotillas.28
The waves of refugees created a crisis for the United States. The Clin-
ton administration had a moral obligation to take in the hungry and sick of
the world, but not so many of them all at once. President Clinton insisted
that he would not let the boat people into the U.S. proper, contining the
balseros who were intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard to the U.S. Naval
Station at Guantdnamo Bay in Cuba. In the meantime, thousands more left
the island. Washington realized that it had to negotiate some kind of deal
with the Castro regime to stem this flow of humanity and diffuse the politi-
cally explosive situation.
On September 9, 1994, the U.S. and Cuba signed a new migration
agreement in which the U.S. pledged that it would allow a minimum of
20,000 Cubans to enter the U.S. annually. In exchange, Cuba pledged to
prevent any further unlawful departures from the island. This agreement was
followed up with another one on May 2, 1995, when the Clinton admini-
stration and the Castro regime agreed to deal with outstanding refugee issues
from the previous summer. Cubans interdicted at sea would no longer be
taken to a safe haven but repatriated to Cuba. The approximately 32,000
Cuban balseros who had been moved to the U.S. naval base in GuantInamo
Bay and were eligible for entry into the U.S. would be permitted to go to the
U.S. mainland. A compromise had been reached and some form of relations
commenced. Creative Problem Solving had shown some results.
In May 1995, Clinton announced that he would oppose the Helms-
Burton Bill, still languishing in Congress. The Cubans then took a number
of unilateral steps towards some reform. The Cuban government approved a
license for Cable News Network, increased relations with the Catholic
Church, further opened the Cuban economy to joint ventures, slowly al-
lowed some forms of private enterprise, and released some political prison-
ers.
Such an incrementalist and flexible approach, part of President Clin-
ton's calibrated response, was a start and saw some results. But leftover
sentiments from the days of the Cold War urged the U.S. to soldier on in de-
stroying the Communist regime in Cuba, even if it did not pose a direct na-
tional threat to the United States. Brothers to the Rescue, a Cuban exile
group based in Miami, continued its flights in and around Cuban airspace,
ostensibly to assist balseros caught in the Florida Straits. On February 24,
1996, two of the group's airplanes-U.S. registered aircraft-were inter-
cepted and shot down by Cuban MiG jets after allegedly invading Cuban
28. The situation got so surreal that a French film crew, in Cuba to shoot a scene for a
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airspace and dropping anti-Castro leaflets. 9
Suddenly, the Helms-Burton Bill came back to life. It was an election
year, and Bill Clinton did not want to alienate the highly motivated Cuban-
American voters in Florida and New Jersey. There was some saber-rattling"
and political gerrymandering, and a few weeks later, on March 12, 1996, the
Helms-Burton Act was signed into law. President Clinton's "calibrated re-
sponse" policy had gone down in the Florida Straits with the two Cuban ex-
ile airplanes." So had his freedom to maneuver politically around the issue
of Cuba.
B. The Helms-Burton Act - Much Ado About Something
The most striking provision of the Helms-Burton Act is the enshrine-
ment of the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba in U.S. law. Title I, Sec-
tion 102 codifies all current Executive Orders and Regulations, making it
necessary for the U.S. Congress, and not the President, to amend any exist-
ing law. 2 Prior to this change, the embargo was based solely on Presidential
Executive orders. It could be tightened or loosened at the President's discre-
tion as conditions and, more likely, geopolitics dictated. President Clinton
has now been left with close to no discretion in formulating U.S. policy to-
wards Cuba. The Clinton Administration's policy of "calibrated response"
has been dismantled in the process.
So was any hope of a multilateral approach to bringing democratic re-
form to the island. Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, dealing with the
"Protection of Property Rights of United States Nationals," allows U.S. na-
tionals to sue anyone "trafficking" in property confiscated by the Cuban
government in U.S. federal court." The provision extends the right to sue to
citizens who were not U.S. citizens at the time of the confiscation. Thus, the
29. On December 17, 1997, a U.S. judge ordered Cuba to pay close to $187 million in
damages to the families of the three Cuban-Americans who were killed in the incident on
February 24, 1996. Deutche Presse-Agentur, Cuba Ordered to Pay Damages for Plane
Shootdown, Dec. 17, 1997.
30. See James Cooper, Washington is Overreacting to the Cuban Attack, THE GLOBE &
MAIL, Feb. 27, 1996, at A17.
31. There are some who believe that Castro may have precipitated the resurrection of
the Helms-Burton Bill, then languishing in Congress, by purposely shooting down the two
airplanes, flown by the Miami-based Brothers to the Rescue, on February 24, 1996. Know-
ing that the impending U.S. legislation would send a chilling effect to foreign investment
on his island, Castro may have wished to slow down the dollarization of his country's
economy and the concurrent bifurcation of society into those with dollars and those with-
out. In essence, the passage of the Helms-Burton Act has been a boon to Castro's regime.
Domestic support for the Communist regime had been flagging. The regime could shut
down a pro-democratic political council in Cuba that had been planning more dissident ac-
tivities. Moreover, the party-controlled Cuban press could assist Castro in playing the na-
tionalist card by claiming that the U.S. simply wanted to return Cuba to the pre-1959 status
quo ante.
32. Pamela S. Falk, The U.S.-Cuba Agenda Opportunity or Stalemate, 39 J. IN.
TERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 153, 161 n.2 (1997).
33. Helms-Burton Act § 302 (1995).
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Helms-Burton Act provides U.S. citizens (including Cuban exiles who have
become U.S. citizens) with property claims against the Cuban government
the right to sue foreign investors who purchase an equity interest in, man-
age, or enter into joint ventures using property and assets that, in some
cases, had been confiscated from U.S. nationals. In essence, Title III em-
powers wealthy Cuban Americans to commence an action against corpora-
tions of all nationalities with a view to extorting some sort of financial set-
tlement from them because of the threat of treble damages that will be
applied under some very vague criteria. Before the ink from President Clin-
ton's pen dried on the Helms-Burton Act, Nicolas J. Gutierrez, Jr., of Mi-
ami's Adorno & Zeder, created 75 Florida corporations as potential plain-
tiffs so that even non-U.S. nationals could sue under the new Act.
34
This aspect of the Act was a very serious extension of the extraterritori-
ality of American law. President Clinton knew the possible explosive nature
of Title III, and that there would be a flood of individual and class action
lawsuits. From bilateral State visits to international multilateral summits, he
would be forced to defend the fact that American legislators were making
rules to punish foreign companies that trade with Cuba. A saving grace, al-
beit a temporary one, came when President Clinton negotiated with Con-
gress the right to suspend Title III for periods of six months. While Title III
was to become effective August 1, 1996, it was suspended on July 16,
1996,"5 and again on January 3, 1997. On July 16, 1997, Title III was sus-
pended a third time. 6 It is likely that such suspensions will continue as long
as Clinton deems it necessary to court international public opinion and favor
with American trading partners whose companies are now doing business in
Cuba. Despite these interim measures to suspend the enforcement of Title
III, it is little wonder that the international community has been up in arms
about the Helms-Burton Act's illegal reach.
Title III has not stood alone in causing such furor. Title IV of the
Helms-Burton Act, entitled "Exclusion of Certain Aliens," has also created
its share of international tension. It denies admission to the United States to
foreign nationals-including corporate officers, principals, or shareholders
with a controlling interest of an entity, and their spouses, minor children, or
agents-who are determined to be involved in the trafficking of confiscated
U.S. property.17 Exceptions exist in cases of trade for humanitarian medical
reasons or in which persons are defending themselves in legal actions re-
garding the confiscation. The U.S. government sent out letters to interna-
tional companies operating in Cuba, informing the recipients that they and
their families were at risk of becoming persona non grata in the U.S. be-
cause of charges the companies were operating in Cuba on property seized
34. Ann Davis, Helms-Burton First Test Comes Soon, NAT'LL.J., Apr. 1, 1996, at A6.
35. Drew Fagan, Clinton Stalls Anti-Cuba Law, THE GLOBE & MAIL, July 17, 1996, at
Al.
36. Clinton Extends Delay of Cuba Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, July 17, 1997, at Al.
37. Helms-Burton Act § 401 (1995).
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by the Castro regime from American interests. 8
The Helms-Burton Act does not just attempt to punish foreigners. The
legislation further enhances the embargo by prohibiting any United States
citizen from financing, in any manner, a foreign person trafficking in United
States property nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise seized without ade-
quate and effective compensation by Castro's regime. 9
In short, the Helms-Burton Act strengthens the economic embargo
against the Cuban people. In an era where the American government has en-
gaged Communist regimes in China, North Korea, and Vietnam, its ap-
proach to Cuba remains less forgiving and a complete violation of both in-
ternational law and common sense.
II. WHY THE HELMS-BURTON ACT IS A POOR IDEA
A. Violations of International Law
There is little doubt that the American embargo against Cuba violates
international law. The question is at which level the greatest violation oc-
curs. The embargo is an affront to the United Nations Charter; it violates
international conventions governing international trade; and it is a breach of
the NAFTA. The United States is a contracting party to all of these interna-
tional instruments.
1. Violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the
Organization of American States
The doctrine of State sovereignty is a fundamental principle of the in-
ternational system. The U.S. embargo against Cuba, and in particular the
implementation of rules penalizing third parties from third-party countries,
is an attempt by the American government to enforce American laws on
subjects of the laws of other countries. Such extraterritorial legislation is
fundamentally a violation of international law.4
It should be little wonder, then, that the international community has
gone as far as censuring the United States for continuing the embargo on a
regular basis. On November 3, 1993, the Forty-Eighth General Assembly of
the United Nations adopted a resolution calling for the end of the United
States' trade embargo against Cuba.41 The resolution condemns "the prom-
ulgation and application of Member States of laws and regulations whose
38. Drew Fagan, U.S. to Expand Cuban Ban, THE GLOBE & MAIL, July 20, 1996, at B1.
39. Helms-Burton Act § 103 (1995).
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 402-403 (1986). These sec-
tions set forth limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce laws and
regulations under international law.
41. G.A. Res. 48/16, U.N. G.A.O.R.
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extrajudicial effects affect the sovereignty of other states."42 Similar resolu-
tions were passed by the General Assembly on October 26, 1994; November
2, 1995; and November 12, 1996. In the latter resolution, the General As-
sembly again overwhelmingly approved a resolution urging the U.S. to end
its decades-old embargo against Cuba.' The vote was 138 to 3 (with 24 ab-
stentions), by far the greatest majority for the international censure. On No-
vember 5, 1997, the General Assembly again urged the repeal of extraterri-
torial laws like the Helms-Burton Act.4'5 The reason for such international
condemnation is clear-the U.S. is attempting to impose its values and laws
on subjects of other countries' laws, thereby breaching the sovereignty of
those third-party countries.
Extraterritoriality clearly violates international law, as evidenced by the
Charter of the United Nations. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits
"the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations."4 6 Some have argued that an economic sanction like an
embargo is a form of force and a direct violation of this provision. Moreo-
ver, the intended purpose of the embargo is to bring about the change of re-
gime in Cuba, another breach of the political independence of the island na-
tion and a violation of this fundamental tenet of international law. '7 The
United Nations "is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its
members."4 8  Every country retains its inalienable right to self-
determination-the pursuit of its own economic, social, and political desti-
nies. Within its sovereign borders, the State is king. Thus, no State can
promulgate laws that affect entities in other States. Accordingly, exraterrito-
riality is prohibited by the U.N. Charter.
Promulgation of extraterritorial laws can also be viewed as contrary to
the Charter of the Organization of American States ("OAS"), of which the
United States is a founder and principal player. 49 The OAS Charter prohibits
the extraterritorial reach of a State's authority: "Each State has the right to
develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally. In this
free development, the State shall respect the rights of the individual and the
42. Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed
by the United States of America Against Cuba, G.A. Res. 52/10, U.N. G.A.O.R., 52d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/10 (1997).
43. Resolution 49/9 and 50/10, respectively.
44. G.A. Res. 51/17, U.N. G.A.O.R. See U.N. Renews Call for an End to Cuba Em-
bargo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at A6.
45. U.N. Doc. A/52/L.11 (Nov. 12, 1997).
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
47. Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations was declared a norm of jus co-
gens, a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is permitted, in
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits),
I.C.J. REP., 14 (1986) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1.
49. The U.S. had Cuba expelled from the Pan-American organization in 1962.
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principles of universal morality."5 The OAS Charter also provides the fol-
lowing:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indi-
rectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any
other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but
also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the per-
sonality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural ele-
ments.
Clearly, this article limits any OAS member's ability to extend its sovereign
rule extraterritorially in order to influence and control the internal affairs of
another State.
Beyond the laws that come from these international conventions, there
exists a body of customary international legal norms that derive from State
practice and State acquiescence to such practice. They also firmly proscribe
extraterritoriality. According to the International Court of Justice, there ex-
ists in customary international law, as evidenced by the United Nations
Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States, a duty of
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another State."
2. Violations of International Trade Law
In addition to the laws that regulate the international system for the
maintenance of inter-state relations and international order, the U.S. em-
bargo against Cuba violates other fundamental provisions of international
law. For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"')"
was established to promote international trade and prevent contracting par-
ties from mandating unfair trading practices in the international marketplace.
Article V specifically reserves freedom of transit of international goods, no
matter their origination, providing in part the following:
There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting
party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic
in transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties. No distinc-
tion shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of ori-
gin, departure, entry, exit, or destination, or on any circumstances relat-
ing to the ownership of the goods, of vessels or of other means of
transport."
As concerns its own trading relations, the United States is fully within
its rights to choose with whom it will do business internationally. Accord-
50. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, art. 17.
51. Id. art. 19.
52. See Nicaragua, supra note 47.
53. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A5, 55 U.N.T.S.
188 [hereinafter GATT].
54. Id. art. V(2).
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ingly, the U.S. can choose not to trade with Cuba. However, a fundamental
principle of the GATT convention and the international trading regime, of
which the United States is a founding architect, prohibits its contracting
parties from taking any action that restricts the flow of trade of another
Member State.5" Article IX of GATT specifically forbids any limitation or
restriction upon the importation of a product of another GATT Contracting
Party.
56
On the other hand, the U.S. government has attempted to justify its
trade law infractions by pointing to Article XXI of GATT, the provision that
relieves signatories from applying GATT provisions to the extent necessary
to preserve the security interest of the regulating State. A contracting party
to GATT then may be permitted to impose protectionist measures, but only
in the event that such measures are necessary to preserve its national secu-
rity.57
In an era of globalized economic relations, the Helms-Burton Act is a
step backwards. Just ask America's trading partners.
B. Damage to U.S. Trade Relations
1. Protest from Europe
The European Union ("EU") has never been happy with the extraterrito-
rial zeal of U.S. law. From American antitrust legislation to copyright pro-
tection, there have been constant clashes with the Europeans over the extra-
territoriality of U.S. laws. This criticism is all well deserved. In 1992, the
European Community (now the European Union) protested the Torricelli
Act, stating in part the following:
[T]he European Community and its Member States cannot accept the
extraterritorial extension of U.S. jurisdiction as a matter of law and pol-
icy... The Bill... would also prohibit any vessel from engaging in
trade with the United States if the vessel has entered a port in Cuba dur-
ing the preceding 180 days. Such a measure would be in conflict with
55. Id. art. V.
56. Id. art. XI(l).
57. The U.S. has claimed that its actions against Cuba could be justified under Article
XXI of the GATr treaty, a provision that specifically exempts contracting parties from
compliance with provisions of the treaty where potential threats to national security exist.
With the end of the Cold War and the U.S.' growing trade relations with China and Viet-
nam, the U.S. government cannot seriously contend that Cuba remains a threat to U.S. na-
tional security. Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Wayne Smith, Senior Fel-
low at the Center for International Policy, stated: 'The Cold War is over. Cuba is no longer
even a potential threat to us or any other country. It is not even a foreign policy concern."
U.S. Policy Towards Cuba: Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 103d
Cong., Oct. 7, 1994, 2nd Sess. On the other hand, the Graham Amendment, currently be-
fore Congress and part of a defense budget bill awaiting President Clinton's signature, de-
scribes Cuba as a threat to U.S. national security. See Dalia Acosta, Politics-Latam: Par-
latino Condemns U.S. Graham Amendment, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 17, 1997.
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long-standing rules on comity and international law ......
The opposition to the Helms-Burton Act has been even louder, includ-
ing the European Commission coming out strongly against it."' As its lead-
ers met in Florence in June 1996, the European Union threatened to retaliate
against these or other American attempts to impose extraterritorial secon-
dary boycotts against the target countries.6" It was a major foreign policy and
international trade theme of the leaders' conference.
On October 16, 1996, the EU foreign ministers requested a dispute
panel at a WTO meeting in Geneva to challenge the U.S. legislation. But as
a sop to the United States, the EU provided a more measured response to the
situation in Cuba and its opposition to the Helms-Burton Act in December
1996. The EU formally announced that it "encouraged a process of transi-
tion to pluralist democracy in Cuba... [but also] acknowledged that Cuba
had [begun] a 'tentative' economic opening. [The EU] condemned the use of
coercive measures that served to increase the economic hardship of the Cu-
ban people."6 It wants better human rights conditions for the Cuban people,
but it also wants to trade with Cuba and not be told by the U.S. that it can-
not do so.
The European Commission showed its collective disdain for the extra-
territoriality of the Helms-Burton Act by providing legislation that allows
EU companies to seek compensation in court for damages resulting from
being penalized under the Helms-Burton Act.6" The basic intention of the so-
called "blocking statute" was to encourage European companies to disobey
the U.S. legislation and enable them to counter-sue European subsidiaries of
U.S. companies.
Individually, too, the members of the European Union have undertaken
such legislative responses against the United States for enacting extraterrito-
rial policies concerning Cuban trade. In 1980, the United Kingdom passed
into law the Protection of Trading Interests Act, which was a response to
American extraterritorial measures. This Act encourages British companies
to ignore American laws that affect foreign sovereignty, like those regarding
third countries and Cuban trade. 6 Other European States, such as France,
58. Letter from Ambassador Demarche of the European Community to the U.S. De-
partment of State, Apr. 7, 1992.
59. European Union: Council Regulation 2271/96 of 22 November 1996, Protecting
Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third
County, 36 I.L.M. 125 (1997). See also Vaughan Lowe, Helms-Burton and EC Regulation
2271/96, CAMBRIDGE. L.J. 248 (1997); Dr. JOrgen Huber, The Helms-Burton Blocking Stat-
ute of the European Union, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 699 (1997).
60. Craig R. Whitney, Europe Assails U.S. Effort to Punish Investing in Cuba and
Iran, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1996, at A9.
61. Falk, supra note 32, at 154.
62. Neil Buckley & Guy de Jonqui~res, E. U. Sets Up Machinery to Retaliate over
Cuba Penalties, FIN. TIMEs, July 19, 1996, at 6; Reuters, EU Set to Approve Plan to Resist
U.S. Cuba Bill, THE GLOBE & MAIL, July 30, 1996, at B7.
63. On June 17, 1996, the U.K. Parliament passed the new English Arbitration Act,
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have made diplomatic protests in response to U.S. penalties against compa-
nies incorporated outside the United States that have been found by Ameri-
can authorities to be breaching American laws. Most recently, France
showed its disdain for U.S. foreign policy by signing an agreement with
Cuba that protects the interests of French companies that invest in Cuba.'
But not every EU Member State is so adamant about criticizing the im-
pugned U.S. legislation. Indeed, the reaction to the Helms-Burton Act has
shown some chinks in the European Union's armor.6" Europe's external
trade policy has been a hallmark of the regional organization's success. The
power that the now 15 members of the EU collectively wield is quite sig-
nificant. Under the tutelage of Sir Leon Brittan, the Vice-President of the
European Commission responsible for trade policy, the EU has been able to
open markets across the world, lead in trade liberalization, and secure access
for European countries.' The excesses of predatory trading by EU partners
have been curbed as well.
To avoid a major breach with the U.S. that could threaten the future of
the World Trade Organization, the EU postponed its challenge to the Helms-
Burton Act.' In exchange, the United States agreed to continue to waive Ti-
tle III of the law-the provision of the law allowing U.S. citizens to sue in-
vestors who profit from seized property-and to seek a change to Title IV-
the provision that bars executives of companies investing in confiscated
property, and their families, from entering the United States. In addition, the
two parties agreed to work out a common policy on properties seized by the
Communist government in Cuba after Fidel Castro took power in 1959.
In maintaining the Helms-Burton Act on the statute books, the United
States has also acted in a manner that is disruptive and counterproductive to
a functioning international trade regime. In a ridiculous flurry of diplomatic
exchanges concerning the EU's protest of the Helms-Burton Act, the Ameri-
can government has threatened to undermine the whole WTO process, tell-
ing the Europeans that the U.S. would invoke a "national security excep-
tion" based on an assertion that Cuba poses a security threat to the United
which partially addresses this issue. See United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 1996, 35
I.L.M. 155 (1996).
64. Craig R. Whitney, Ignoring U.S., France Signs Accord Protecting Cuba Ties, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 1997, at A3. See also Marian Nash Leich, Conflict of Jurisdiction-U.S.
Economic Regulation, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 836, 840 (1982).
65. The Helms-Burton Act row has caused some rifts internally at the European Union.
The EU led the charge that the American legislation was a violation of GATT and threat-
ened to go to the World Trade Organization to press its case. The EU's powerful and cohe-
sive opposition included threats of retaliatory measures against the U.S. Denmark, the
country that rejected entry into the European Union's Maastricht Treaty in its first referen-
dum on the issue, threatened to break EU ranks. Copenhagen would not allow its trade
policy to be dictated to by Brussels. A last-minute deal was worked out, and the fifteen
Member States could still speak as one. The weak foundations of the European Union were
demonstrated, however.
66. See Leon Brittan, New Tactics for EU Trade, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1996, at A20.
67. David E. Sanger, Europe Postpones Challenge to U.S. on Havana Trade, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1997, at Al.
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States. The WTO panel would then be denied jurisdiction, as the matter
would no longer involve a trade dispute.
When the WTO named three international experts to adjudicate the dis-
pute, the U.S. went so far as to challenge publicly the WTO's fitness to ad-
judicate the dispute and announce that it would not cooperate with the panel.
This stance by the U.S. government is not a good portent of things to come,
as new trade issues arise and new negotiations of the liberalization of other
sectors of trade come closer. Sir Leon met with American legislators on
May 7, 1997, to discuss the pending settlement over the dispute. Sir Leon
said that the April 1997 agreement with the U.S. was "not a solution to the
problem, but has defused it and is a launch pad for further progress."6 EU
Commissioner Hans van den Broek has confirmed that the EU would revive
the WTO disputes panel if Washington reneged on the April 1997 deal.69 In
the meantime, the European Parliament weighed in and took the European
Commission to task. On May 15, 1997, the European Parliament passed a
resolution criticizing the Helms-Burton Act and the extraterritorial policies
of the United States and urged the European Commission to reintroduce its
case at the WTO unless Parliament receives a satisfactory answer for its
abandonment."
The deadline on dealing with the issue then passed with little action.
The October 15, 1997, deadline came and went, yet no resolution appeared
in sight. Negotiation sessions at an Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD") multilateral meeting in November proved to be
fruitless, as did a December 1998 Transatlantic Summit between the U.S.
and the EU. Sir Leon's visit to the State Department in mid-March 1998 did
little to put an end to this diplomatic row.7" By settling temporarily with the
United States, the EU left Canada and Mexico holding the bag to fight the
American legislation, disappointed and angry over the EU's inconsistent ap-
proach to world trade issues. The result is a trade row between Canada and
the EU. Sir Leon Brittan chided Canada's lack of action on the NAFTA
front. "We put our head above the block and Canada has declined to do so,"
Sir Leon told reporters as he headed into quadrilateral trade talks with his
counterparts in Canada, Japan, and the United States on May 1, 1997.7" The
EU's Trade Commissioner continued: "I find it a little curious that we have
gone ahead and challenged the United States, taken a very high-profile ac-
tion and got some progress from the United States as a result of that, very
substantial progress. Canada has held back on (action through) NAFTA."
And while Sir Leon may have been right about Canada's attack of the
68. Reuters, EU's Brittan Meets U.S. Lawmakers on Helms-Burton, May 7, 1997.
69. Reuters, Congress Plans to Tighten Anti-Cuba Law, Euro-MP, May 15, 1997.
70. European Parliament Session News Press Release, WTO and the Helms Burton
Act, May 15, 1997.
71. Nancy Dunne, Swords Sheathed Over Cuba, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at A6.
72. Heather Scoffield (Reuters), Brittan Chides Canada for Slow Action on Helms-
Burton, May 2, 1997.
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Helms-Burton Act under NAFTA, Canada has long been a vocal opponent
of both U.S. legislation that encroaches on Canadian sovereignty and the
U.S. embargo against Cuba.
2. Protest from Canada
Canada has a long experience with the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law in its own jurisdiction, stretching back to the days of embargoes
against Canadian companies doing business with China and the application
of American antitrust laws to prevent government-approved activities in
Canada in the cases of radio patents, potash, and uranium exports. Canadian
foreign policy towards Cuba has traditionally favored trade in non-strategic
goods. In 1968, as the Trudeau government slashed defense spending, it fo-
cused on cultivating good relations with certain leftist governments that the
Americans found intolerable. Cuba was first on the list.
Currently, Canada is Cuba's largest trading partner. Canadians represent
the largest proportion of tourists visiting Cuban beaches, and Canadian cor-
porations hold the greatest number of joint ventures of all foreign investors.
For the Canadians, the embargo was always a problem. Events of May 1991
foreshadowed what was to come for the Canadians. Regor International, a
Canadian corporation, ordered 29,000 cases of Pepsi from Pepsi Cola Mont-
real, but Pepsi canceled the order when it learned that the final destination
for the product was Cuba. Pepsi Cola Montreal claimed that, due to discus-
sion between its Canadian office and the head office in the United States, it
would be unable to fill any orders where the product's ultimate destination
was Cuba.
The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs responded to this soft drink
debacle by reprimanding the U.S., specifically opposing the direct and indi-
rect extraterritorial application of U.S. trade policy towards Cuba through
the U.S. government or U.S. parent corporations. The reprimand has grown
particularly loud due to the new set of American legislation that goes be-
yond its own sovereign jurisdiction. As the Helms-Burton Act was making
its way into U.S. lawbooks, Prime Minister Jean Chr6tien told President
Clinton that Canada would "never accept the notion of extraterritorial appli-
cation of American laws. 73
Canada has demonstrated its independent foreign policy by voting to
condemn the U.S. embargo against Cuba in the United Nations. The Cana-
dian government resumed sending aid to Cuba in mid-1994, starting with
desperately needed food, medicine, and vitamins. When Lloyd Axworthy,
Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a much publicized visit to Cuba
in January 1996 and signed agreements with Havana for trade and aid,74 U.S.
73. Susan Delacourt, PM Denounces U.S. Cuba Bill, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 4,
1997, at Al.
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Senator Jesse Helms called the visit "shameful,"" likening it to former Brit-
ish Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Adolf Hitler in
1938.76 With the sovereignty issues that the Helms-Burton Act had engen-
dered, it should have been no surprise then that by year-end Canada had im-
plemented legislation to allow Canadians to seek recovery in their courts for
any losses suffered as a result of American legislation.77 The Foreign Extra-
territorial Measures Act received royal assent on December 30, 1996, and
went into force two days later.78
Canada has also proceeded on regional and international fronts. The
Canadian government initially agreed to join the EU at the WTO in chal-
lenging the Helms-Burton Act.7" With the EU negotiating a separate deal
with the U.S. to avoid a trade challenge of the legislation, however, Canada
may be fighting the dispute before the WTO alone."0 The Canadian govern-
ment has indicated that, depending on the outcome of a challenge to the
Helms-Burton Act at the WTO, a case may go forward under NAFTA.81 In
April and May 1996, Canada held consultations with the United States un-
der the dispute settlement provision of NAFTA.82 The Canadian government
has also held discussions with the Mexican government to rally support.
And while the debate over the Helms-Burton Act remains behind diplomatic
doors, the option to use NAFTA in a more adversarial way remains. "I've
still got the NAFTA challenge in my back pocket," warned Canadian Trade
Minister Art Eggleton. "If things break down and don't proceed, then I can
always use that." 3
Of course, a win under NAFTA is not a sure thing. The United States
could always claim a national security exemption under NAFTA, among
others. If Canada were to lose the case, an international precedent for the le-
gality of Helms-Burton-type legislation would arise. A number of Canadian
interests in Washington would also be jeopardized. 4 The most damaging re-
75. Drew Fagan, Our Man in Havana Wakes up Washington, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Jan.
25, 1997, at Dl.
76. Reuters, Cuba Visit Likened to Appeasing Hitler, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 21,
1997, at A14.
77. Larry Rohter, Cuba Measure Strikes Back at the U.S., N.Y. TEs, Jan. 11, 1997.
78. Supra note 9; see also Dow Jones Service, Anti-Helms Bill Receives Royal Assent,
THE GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 31, 1996, at B7.
79. Reuters, Canada Joins EU in Fighting Anti-Cuban Law, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Oct.
3, 1996, at B6.
80. Laura Eggertson & Peter Cook, Canada to Fight Cuba Law Alone, THE GLOBE &
MAiL, Feb. 13, 1997, at Al.
81. Id at A15.
82. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 2006, ch. 20.
83. Heather Scoffield, EU Chides Canada for Low Action on Helms-Burton, Reuters,
May 1, 1997.
84. It is easy to see how the Helms-Burton Act runs counter to the negotiations de-
signed to liberalize investment rules among the 29 countries of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development. The impugned legislation continues to affect more
than Canadian-American relations, for it threatens future multilateral efforts to reduce bar-
riers to trade. In the days leading up to talks, Trade Minister Sergio Marchi warned that the
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suit of a Canadian NAFTA complaint could be the strengthening of an al-
ready growing chorus of U.S. Congressional members who do not like the
NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms. Indeed, the U.S. Congress has
shown increasingly little patience in dealing with the dictates of interna-
tional tribunals, viewing the process as a loss of U.S. sovereignty. As a re-
suit, the Canadians are waiting to see what the EU does with respect to its
WTO challenge, temporarily in abeyance. As long as President Clinton
keeps suspending the implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act,
the Canadians have a pyrrhic victory at least. No Canadian companies would
be open to lawsuits in U.S. federal court.
3. Protest from the U.S.' Other Trading Partners
Mexican television ran a series of commercials for a Mexican long-
distance carrier. "Hi, I'm Burton Helms. I came to Mexico for the pleasure
of doing your business," says the leering American executive in new televi-
sion advertisements for the long-distance service of Teldfonos de Mexico,
the telecommunications giant.85 The idea behind the commercial is to show
Mexican consumers that Telemex is a home-grown company, whose net-
work reaches to Mexico's most remote towns.
It is ironic that Telemex is the company using the unpopular American
legislation for its own benefit. Grupo Domos of Mexico, a Mexican tele-
communications company, is under investigation over the "trafficking" of
American property in Cuba.8" The Cuban government sold 49 percent inter-
est in the country's telephone system to the telecommunications giant from
Monterey, and the American government has been hounding the company
ever since.'
Such aggressive policies from Washington have not gone unnoticed in
Mexico City, as powerful opposition politicians have constantly attacked the
U.S. government. Senator Hector Sanchez Lopez, a member of the Party of
the Democratic Revolution, said that the Mexican government "complains
about the extra-territoriality of the [Helms-Burton] law but under the table, it
encourages Mexican companies with investments in Cuba to withdraw from
it; commercial interests have overtaken our foreign relations principles."88
Helms-Burton Act was "obviously a deal-breaker in terms of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment." See Helms-Burton Strikes Again, B.B.C., B.B.C. Summary of World Broad-
casts, Sept. 30, 1997.
85. Julia Preston, A Telecom Revoluci6n in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1996, at Dl.
See also Tim Coone, Number, Please?, LATIN TRADE, Feb. 1997, at 27.
86. Drew Fagan, U.S. to Expand Cuban Ban, THE GLOBE & MAIL, June 20, 1996, at
BI.
87. See Garza's Cuba Venture, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 1994; Mexico Plays Growing Role
in Helping Cuba Withstand U.S. Trade Embargo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1994; and Fidel's
End Run Around Uncle Sam, Bus. WK., May 9, 1994, at 47. Telemex has run into trouble
recently as U.S. regulators complain of the company's virtual stranglehold on Mexico's
long distance carrier industry.
88. Adolfo Garza, Trade Agreements under Senate Scrutiny, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
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Rightist politicians, too, find fault in the government's hypocrisy.
On October 23, 1996, the Mexican government officially enacted its
blocking statute, the Act to Protect Trade and Investment from Foreign Stat-
utes which Contravene International Law." Mexico has also made moves to
reduce its overwhelming dependence on the United States, by entering into
negotiations for a free-trade pact with the European Union.
It is not just Mexico that is upset with the extraterritorial measures that
American legislation is enforcing. Malaysian Prime Minister Matathir bin
Mohamad visited Cuba and defiantly announced that the Helms-Burton Act
would not stop bilateral ties between his country and Cuba.9" The U.S. gov-
ernment has also targeted Israeli and Italian corporations legitimately doing
business in Cuba, sparking criticism from members of those respective
States' governments.
During President Clinton's recent historic visit to South Africa, South
African President Nelson Mandela lectured him on the folly of the U.S.
government's policy towards Cuba.9 Even the Japanese have ignored the
U.S. embargo towards Cuba. On March 18, 1998, Japan and Cuba signed a
debt accord that rescheduled $780 million of debt owed by the Cuban gov-
ernment to more than 180 Japanese companies. Such companies are Cuba's
single largest creditor. Cuba's ambassador to Japan, Ernesto Mel6ndez, ex-
plained that the debt agreement was "an example that the international
community is not taking notice of the U.S. embargo."92
The Helms-Burton Act even drew the fire of the Pope during his visit to
Cuba. In a letter to the Cuban youth, the Pope called the American embargo
on Cuba "deplorable" and said that the embargo affected the most needy in
society. He also criticized such sanctions as "always deplorable because they
hurt the most needy."93
Sept. 4, 1997.
89. Ley de Proteccion al Comercio y La Inversion de Normas Extranjeras que Contra-
vengan el Derecho Internacional, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n of October 23, 1996, at
9-10, 36 I.L.M. 133 (1997). See also James F. Smith, Free-Trade Treaty Sought by Mexico,
E. U., L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at Al.
90. Prime Minister in Cuba Says Helms-Burton Law Will not Stop Ties, Text from Tele
Rebelde & Cuba Vision, Sept. 30, 1997.
91. Elizabeth Shogren, Mandela Gives Clinton Lecture on Libya, Cuba, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1998, at Al; see also Victor Mallet, Mandela Attacks "Unfair" Trade Bill, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, at A2. President Mandela admonished President Clinton during a
news conference: "The United States as the leader of the world should set an example to all
of us to help eliminate tensions throughout the world. And the best way of doing so is to
call upon its enemies to say 'Let's sit down and talk peace."'
92. Pascal Fletcher, Havana Signs Japanese Debt Deal, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1998, at
A6.
93. The letter was handed to a delegation of Catholic youths at a mass in Camaguey,
500 kilometers (300 miles) southeast of Havana. He added, however, that the 35-year-old
embargo was not responsible for all of Cuba's troubles.
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C. The Embargo Against Cuba Violates Common Sense
Aside from contravening fundamental tenets of international law and
incurring the wrath of America's most treasured trading partners, the Helms-
Burton Act itself is antithetical to U.S. practical and commercial interests.
The Act is completely contrary to the U.S. policy as applied elsewhere in the
world: the push for trade relationships that encourage the liberalization of
repressive regimes.94 Historically, international trade and constructive en-
gagement have brought about political change. Such was the case in Eastern
and Central Europe during the 1980s.
But when it comes to the continuing embargo against Cuba, construc-
tive engagement and any sense of consistency in foreign policy seem to have
gone by the wayside. The United States government is ready to pursue
flexible policies relating to those few Communist regimes that remain in the
world--China, North Korea, and Vietnam--often in the face of egregious
and systemic human rights abuses. Washington has granted Most Favored
Nation treatment to Beijing despite the latter's poor record on democratic
governance and human rights protection.95 Trade links with China have not
only gone without punishment, but with U.S. government assistance. On the
other hand, Cuba remains a trading pariah for the United States. Relations
with Havana, even for companies that are not subject to U.S. laws, are
loaded with many risks.
And while the State Department sent out letters to the families of corpo-
rate executives from foreign countries who do business with the Cuban gov-
ernment warning of their possible blacklisting from entry to the United
States as per Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act, the U.S. government has
looked the other way as its own corporations and citizens have sought out
business opportunities in Cuba. The U.S. Treasury Department formally
prohibits all but journalists, scholars, and those visiting immediate family
members from spending money in Cuba. Nonetheless, thousands of Ameri-
cans travel to Cuba annually to visit family members using circuitous flight
routes. Likewise, despite regulations that prohibit Americans from doing
business with the Communist regime, American business people can be
found throughout Havana. Coming through Mexico, the Bahamas, or Can-
ada, they seek investment opportunities, often through foreign corporate en-
94. In many respects, the United States' economic embargo against Cuba is similar to
the Arab boycott against Israel. For years, the United States was a vocal opponent to the
use of secondary boycotts by the Arab States against companies that did business with Is-
rael and even legislated against its own companies participating in the boycott. How dare
the Arab world tell American companies with whom they may and may not trade, asked
Washington. See Craig R. Auge, Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act: A Questionable Secon-
dary Boycott, 28 LAW& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 575 (1997).
95. On May 19, 1997, President Clinton told the Young Presidents Organization in
Washington that "I have decided, as all my predecessors have since 1980, to extend Most
Favored Nation status to China for the coming year." Office of the Press Secretary, Re-
marks by the President to the Young Presidents Organization, May 19, 1997.
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tities to skirt U.S. regulations. In 1995, about 1,000 Americans visited the
island on exploratory missions.
And why not? The American media has set up operations there. Presi-
dent Clinton authorized CNN to open a Havana bureau and cleared the way
for nine other American news organizations to set up shop in Cuba.96
"American products are all over the island," according to Mark Entwistle,
the Canadian ambassador to Cuba.9" Coca-Cola soft drinks, General Electric
microwaves, Black & Decker power tools, and General Motors automobile
parts are all for sale on the island. Since the U.S. has maintained its embargo
against Cuba, most of the products are shipped through a third country such
as Mexico, Panama, or Venezuela. But even with such a backdoor to doing
business with Cuba, U.S. businesses are losing out. A survey by the Euro-
pean-American Business Council was especially critical of sanctions im-
posed by the U.S. government, as they tend to do more harm to U.S. com-
panies.98  Clearly, there are increasing reasons why not only the
extraterritorial measures promulgated by Congress but also those prohibiting
American corporations from trading with Cuba must be removed.
The lack of common sense in continuing the embargo does not just stop
with the U.S. government or with U.S. corporations doing business in Cuba
through the backdoor. It emanates from the very people that lobbied Con-
gress and the Clinton administration to pass the Helms-Burton Act in the
first place. Legally transferred remittances to Cubans from American citi-
zens amounted to over $800 million in 1996 alone.99 This amount of eco-
nomic aid is over four times the amount of foreign investment coming from
companies like those targeted by the Helms-Burton Act. Gross earnings
from the tourism industry are forecast to reach close to $1.8 billion in
1998.0' If any one group is doing business with the Cubans, or at least is
providing them with some economic sustenance, it is the exile community
so committed to toppling the Castro regime. In sum, the Helms-Burton Act
is not good for the long-term national interests of the United States.
The glaring inconsistencies in U.S. policy towards Cuba and the inter-
national censure with which the Helms-Burton Act has been greeted suggest
96. News Outlets to Open in Cuba, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 13, 1997, at A18; Steven
Lee Myers, Clinton Clears U.S. Media to Open in Cuba, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at A6.
97. Laura Eggertson, Americans in Cuba: Ambassador, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 31,
1997, at B5.
98. The European-American Business Council conducted a study to measure the im-
pact of economic sanctions on multinational companies and found that economic sanctions
have harmed 80 percent of the companies surveyed. With respect to Cuba, the Helms-
Burton Act has harmed 64 percent of companies surveyed. See <HYPERLINK
http://www.,eabc.org/study/htm> and <http://www.eabc.org/study/htm>. See also Sanctions
Hurt U.S. Companies Most, Study Finds, B.B.C., Oct. 1, 1997.
99. Ernest H. Preeg, Myths of Cuba: U.S. Embargo: The Illusion of Compliance,
CARIBBEAN UPDATE INC. (Thomson Corp.), Nov. 2, 1997. More recent figures estimate that
total annual remittances account for up to $1 billion. See Pascal Fletcher, Centrally
Planned and Proud of it, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1998, at 5.
100. See Fletcher, supra note 99, at 5.
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that the Clinton administration and Congressional lawmakers in Washington
must change their current course. Not only is dialogue close to impossible
under the current American policy towards Cuba, but dialogue with Amer-
ica's allies and trading partners has become embroiled in the Castro conun-
drum. Under United States law, the embargo against Cuba can be lifted only
when the Cuban leader is removed from power. Moving away from the in-
flexible rules-based system that put the United States government into this
situation in the first place requires new thinking-a move towards Creative
Problem Solving.
III. CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING APPROACHES TO THE
AMERICAN-CUBAN SITUATION
A. The Fundamentals of Creative Problem Solving
Creative Problem Solving is an evolving approach to law.' °' It combines
law, sociology, social psychology, and organizational behavior in a holistic
fashion.' °2 As a subject matter of academic study, it is primarily being ad-
vanced in law schools in the United States,' 3 although no one jurisdiction
has any monopoly over the subject matter.' In essence, Creative Problem
Solving expands the perspectives from which lawyers, lawmakers, diplo-
mats, and other professionals may serve their respective clients and society
as a whole. The practice of Creative Problem Solving requires a certain
flexibility of mind and a bent towards the interpersonal sensitivity that en-
ables one to apply the most appropriate skill at the most appropriate time.
To resolve the broad diversity of human problems that confront profession-
als and conflict managers-lawyers, diplomats, and mediators, to name but
101. For articles that approach or integrate Creative Problem Solving, see Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984); Gary S. Laser, Educating for Professional Compe-
tence in the Twenty-First Century: Educational Reform at Chicago-Kent College of Law, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 243 (1992); Roger Fisher & William Jackson, Teaching the Skills of
Settlement, 46 SMU L. REv. 1985 (1993); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not
Make Them: Integrating ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. REV. 1995
(1993); Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L.
REv. 527 (1994); Symposium: Creative Problem Solving, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 267
(forthcoming 1998).
102. For a brief exploration of the role of Creative Problem Solving in legal education,
see James M. Cooper, Educating Lawyers for the New Era, S.D. UNIoN-TRm., Mar. 1,
1998, at G-3. For a more in-depth analysis, see James M. Cooper, Towards a New Archi-
tecture: Creative Problem Solving and the Evolution of Law, 34 CAL. W. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1998).
103. For a thorough exploration of the role that problem solving and negotiation
should play in the law school curriculum, see Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law
Schools: Educating Lawyers and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1995).
104. Although limited to problem solving from a linear perspective, a good primer can
be found in STEPHEN NATHANSON, WHAT LAWYERS Do: A PROBLEM SOLVING APPROACH TO
LEGAL PRACTICE (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1997). Creative Problem Solving, by contrast,
is non-linear in nature.
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a few-Creative Problem Solvers must have the skills to select collaboration
and facilitation in some contexts, and a litigious, adversarial, and competi-
tive approach in other contexts.
In Creative Problem Solving, problems are viewed as multidimensional,
often requiring non-legal or multidisciplinary solutions. Most conflicts have
interconnected causes, and their effects often impinge on competing juris-
dictions and disciplines. In short, entrenchment of law and legal precepts
can sometimes work against the solving of problems. In fact, Creative
Problem Solving requires the parties to part with a linear understanding of
the history of the situation. By focusing on a problem's past, we are often
stuck in entrenched positions, from which no collaborative solution can be
found.
Likewise, conflict, so often viewed as a zero-sum game, must be ree-
valuated. With all the binary byproducts that come with conflict-rights and
liabilities, winners and losers, victor and vanquished-a new multipolar,
nonlinear approach must be embraced. The use of Creative Problem Solving
techniques-interactive listening, consensus-building, and proactive dia-
loguing--can assist in resolving situations and in building, maintaining, and
strengthening positive relationships with other, seemingly adversarial, par-
ties. In using such tools, conflict can be viewed as the exploration of op-
portunities--opportunities for integrative bargaining and opportunities for
workable win-win solutions.
In the context of diplomacy and statecraft, Creative Problem Solving
requires a policy of flexibility and openness to collaborate with allies and
adversaries alike. The entrenchment of rights and formalities, the sword of
historical grievances and attendant search for restitution, and the recourse to
unilateral and monodirectional actions are the enemies of Creative Problem
Solving. They are tools that will ensure failure.
After more than thirty-five years of pursuing policy objectives that have
failed miserably, it is time for Washington to approach Havana with new
thinking. Castro remains in power, Havana continues to deny the Cuban
people fundamental freedoms and human rights, and the anti-Castro exile
community in Miami waits for the fall of the Castro regime. It could be
1961 as much as itis 1998.
B. Applying Creative Problem Solving to the American-Cuban Situation
Creative Problem Solving allows for measured gestures and a move to-
wards normalized relations with the Cuban government. The Pope showed
what constructive engagement could do in Eastern Europe. The so-called
"Jaruzelski Effect" was not the only reason to undertake such a mission.' 5 It
105. In June 1979, the newly installed Pope returned to his native Poland and helped to
ignite the Solidarity trade union movement. He returned to Poland again in June 1983 and
stood up for the outlawed Solidarity, in the face of increasing crackdowns by the regime of
strongman Wojciech Jaruzelski. In June 1991, the Pope made his first trip to a free Poland,
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is not just about changing the political face of one's adversary and encour-
aging a change in regime. It is also about alleviating the hardships that the
Cuban people are facing daily-the lack of health and medical facilities and
proper nutrition that has come with the tightening of the economic embargo.
Many Americans are calling for an end to the economic boycott against
Cuba. It started with the Church. Following a visit to Cuba, Boston-based
Cardinal Bernard Law wrote a column in The Boston Globe criticizing the
U.S. government's economic embargo against Cuba.' 6 Indeed, religious or-
ganizations have taken the lead in calling for an end to the U.S. embargo
against Cuba. On January 21, 1998, the day the Pope arrived in Cuba, an
advertisement ran in The New York Times that called for an end to the U.S.
economic embargo against Cuba. It also called for Washington to
"reevaluate its policies towards Cuba."'" Signed and sponsored by a number
of religious institutions in the United States, the advertisement called for "a
healing and dialogue" between "the people of Cuba and the people of the
United States" to help end the "years of suspicion and hostility between our
governments that have deformed the relationship between our countries. '
American leaders have long recognized that their government's em-
bargo against Cuba was harming the Cuban people and doing little to
change the Communist regime. Finally, they are beginning to say so pub-
licly. United States business leader David Rockefeller has criticized the
Helms-Burton Law, explaining his "sensation of horror" when President
Clinton signed it into law. "' Rockefeller has founded Americans for Hu-
manitarian Trade with Cuba, a lobby group that includes Dwayne Andreas,
Chairman of Archer Daniels Midland, Carla Hills, President Reagan's Trade
Representative, Lloyd Bentsen, former Senator and Secretary of the Treas-
ury in the first Clinton administration, and John J. Sheenhan, Retired U.S.
Army General and former head of the Atlantic Command. Along with mem-
bers of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, this blue-ribbon business group is
lobbying for the passage of two pieces of legislation pending in Congress to
lift the embargo on the sale of food and medicine to Cuba."'
The first piece of legislation, the Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act of
1997, was introduced in June 1997 in Congress and was cosponsored by a
bipartisan group of 84 representatives. The Cuban Women and Children
Humanitarian Act, introduced in the Senate in November 1997, was also
supported by a bipartisan group. Both bills aimed to revoke the ban on the
drawing huge crowds and much praise for his work in bringing down the Iron Curtain and
returning democracy to Poland.
106. Diego Ribadeneira, Boston Cardinal Critical of U.S., BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11,
1996.
107. Groups' Ad Criticizes Boycott of Cuba, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1998, at B5.
108. Id.
109. Rockefeller Blasts Helms-Burton Law, IAC NEWSLETTER DATABASE (Thomson
Corp.) Nov. 1, 1997.
110. Stanley Meisler, U.S. to Look at Easing Cuba Aid Ban, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1998,
at A6.
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sale of medicine and food to Cuba-clearly the most inhumane and odious
portions of the embargo.
Before the whole embargo can be lifted, however, a more gradual ap-
proach may be in order-a renewal of the policy of "calibrated response"
first favored by the Clinton administration. A greater dialogue with Havana
is necessary before the economic sanctions can be lifted. It is not just the
U.S. government that has to change its ways. Some good faith measures by
the Castro regime are also in order. The main justification behind the em-
bargo against Cuba is that economic sanctions will get political results. In
essence, the embargo is intended to force the Cuban government to change
its economic and political policies. What the powers in Washington do not
understand is that Cuba has already made many changes that should be
viewed more positively.
For starters, the Cuban government reactivated a joint venture law, first
passed in 1982, which guarantees repatriation of profits and even allows
majority foreign ownership in certain cases. In the summer of 1993, the Cu-
ban government depenalized the use of the U.S. dollar. For years, the mere
act of being in possession of a U.S. dollar bill was a crime punishable by a
prison sentence. That same summer, the Cuban government set up a series
of shops, similar to those that were exclusively created for tourists, on the
island where local Cubans could buy imported consumer goods.
A year later, two significant measures were implemented to tap private
initiative. Most State farms were transformed into worker-run cooperatives,
which received the right to use the property while title to the property itself
still belonged to the State. Once food shortages became too severe, farmers
were permitted by law to sell some of their produce on the open market. By
late 1994, farmers' markets were resurrected, allowing agricultural produc-
ers to sell foodstuffs at unregulated prices. These markets had been intro-
duced in the early 1980s, but were disbanded six years later after the leaders
of the Cuban government saw abundant cases of profiteering. In 1994, the
Cuban government also widened opportunities for self-employment. Many
urban workers displaced by the economic chaos befalling Cuba were now
able to sell their services. Some creative entrepreneurs managed to hire oth-
ers by charging them a nominal fee to be part of a "self-employment
coop.
'' 1
Hence, some moves toward economic freedoms have been made, al-
though there is much more work to be done in allowing entrepreneurial ac-
tivity without burdening it with overtaxation and overregulation. Creative
Problem Solving allows for the recognition of actions taken. The U.S. gov-
ernment must acknowledge these steps by the Castro regime as part of its
111. It is true that the result of dollarizing the economy has been mixed-two econo-
mies now exist concurrently. A two-tiered society, one dollarized and the other stuck in the
inconvertible Cuban peso, is a fact of life in Cuba. With its bent on tourism and foreign
exchange, prostitution became rampant, making Havana of the 1990s look very similar to
that of the 1950s before the Cuban revolution.
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slow march towards fuller dialogue. Indeed, some of the opening in Cuban
society-the legalizing of some entrepreneurial activities, for example--can
be attributed to the low-level diplomatic dialogue between the Clinton ad-
ministration and Havana in 1994 and 1995. The next step for Havana has to
come in the form of political action-the one-party system under the Cuban
Communist Party must be opened and the freedom of association and ex-
pression protected. This step may be unlikely at first, given Castro's com-
plete rejection of a multiparty open political process.
Equally unlikely is that a total reversal of U.S. policy towards Cuba can
occur in quick succession. The best first gesture by the United States, and
one which would be a measure of good faith shown to her trading partners,
would be the repeal of the Helms-Burton Act. The Creative Problem Solv-
ing approach to the Castro conundrum requires that the inane regime created
by the Helms-Burton Act be scrapped, thereby providing at least a partial
lifting of the overall economic embargo.
The embargo has ravaged the island's economy. One Cuban study esti-
mates that non-enforcement of the Torricelli Act and just a partial lifting of
the embargo could quickly produce a doubling of import capacity and a 25
percent hike in the Cuban national income.12 Maybe then the Cuban gov-
ernment could afford to import the food and medicine it so richly requires.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE POPE, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE POLITBURO
As the Pope was ready to board his airplane for Rome, having wound
up his historic visit to Cuba, Fidel Castro spoke to the aging missionary and
replied to the Pontiff's calls for more political freedoms. From the tarmac in
Havana, Castro said, "For all your words, even those with which there might
be disagreement, I offer my thanks."...3 Indeed, the Pontiff's trip had been a
watershed in the history of the Communist nation. A formal dialogue had
begun between the two aging representatives of the world's last bastions of
overarching dialectical ideologies-the Roman Catholic Church and Com-
munism. Indeed, some results began to show from the visit almost immedi-
ately.
It was not by accident that, just weeks after the Pope's visit, the Cuban
government announced that it would be releasing more than 200 prisoners,
many of them political detainees." 4 This move was the biggest pardon of
prisoners in more than two decades, and was, according to Foreign Minister
Roberto Robaina, in response to an appeal for clemency made by Pope John
112. Elena C. Alvarez, Algunos Escenarios Sobra la Evoluci6n Future del Bloqueo,
Paper Presented at XVII Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (Atlanta,
Mar. 1994), at 36.
113. S. Lynne Walker, Pope's Stirring Appeal for Liberty Electrifies Cubans, S.D.
UNIoN-TRIB., Jan. 30, 1998, at A3; One Small Chink in Cuba's Prison Doors, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 21, 1998, at 33.
114. Cuba to Free 200 Prisoners, FiN. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1998, at 1.
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Paul II during his historic visit."5 On April 7, 1998, twelve political prison-
ers, all of whose cases were raised by the Pope during his visit with Castro,
were flown into exile in Canada. The twelve were all serving sentences for
deemed political crimes against Cuba."6
Moreover, just weeks after the Pope's visit, a marked change occurred
in Havana's policies that most concerned the Vatican. At his acceptance
speech, having been reelected President of Cuba for an additional five-year
term, Castro announced to Cuba's National Assembly that, as a
"revolutionary and public figure," he was against abortion, especially when
it is used as a form of birth control." 7 Throughout the Pope's visit to Cuba,
the Pontiff rallied for family values and criticized the rampant abortion rate
in Cuba-estimated to terminate as many as 40 percent of all pregnancies." 8
The Cuban leader's comments on abortion were a clear indication that he
had listened to the Pope's alarm and was making concessions.
During his visit to Cuba, the Pope called for the reopening of Cuba's
religious schools, closed by the Revolution since 1961. The Pope also con-
sistently pressed for the need to protect fundamental freedoms, such as tthe
right of assembly and expression. The fact that such calls were carried on
Cuban State Television and were not deleted from the broadcast was a case
in point that such an opening, albeit small, had begun."' Indeed, the dia-
logue between the Vatican and Havana had shown some tangible results.
There were also some consequences of the Pope's visit concerning the
Helms-Burton Act. The Pontiff derided the U.S. embargo against Cuba and
its effects on the Cuban people. The United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF) has reported that the embargo is one of several factors adversely
affecting children in Cuba. Moreover, women's health services have seri-
ously declined in the past few years, and there is no access to drugs for the
sick and ailing. A lack of supplies has led to the closure of forty percent of
the water chlorination plants, increasing the incidence of typhoid fever, dys-
entery, viral hepatitis, acute diarrheal diseases, and parasitism, all serious
threats to children's health. It is no surprise that the Pope, on the last day of
his visit to Cuba, called the U.S. embargo against Cuba an "oppressive eco-
115. A few days following the initial report, however, Robaina made clear that this
gesture was not intended as a bargaining ploy to obtain an easing of the U.S. economic em-
bargo. He also announced that the Cuban government would actually be releasing 300 pris-
oners, as opposed to the 200 first announced. See Pardons "Not Bargaining Ploy," FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at 2; One Small Chink in Cuba's Prison Doors, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21,
1998, at 33.
116. Pascal Fletcher, Havana Deports 12 to Cuba, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at A5.
117. Pascal Fletcher, Castro: No to Chastity Belts, No to Cokes, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 26,
1998, at 6. See also Brother Fidel and the Women of Cuba, ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 1998, at
42 [hereinafter Women of Cuba].
118. See Women of Cuba, supra note 117.
119. One could argue that, since the Pope's visit was sanctioned and sponsored by the
Cuban government and the Communist Party-led administration had given the Cuban peo-
ple the day off to see the Pope, this alleged opening was merely a guise and not the institu-
tionalization of fundamental political freedoms and human rights.
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nomic measure-unjust and ethically unacceptable-imposed from outside
the country.'1 20 Indeed, the embargo is not changing the Cuban government,
but it is starving the Cuban people. Since the Pope's visit, U.S. legislators
and business people have taken their lobbying efforts into high gear to leg-
islate exceptions-including the provision of food and medicine-to the
long-standing economic embargo.
On March 20, 1998, President Clinton announced an easing of the em-
bargo against Cuba. Washington was to end the bureaucratic procedure that
stifled the shipment of medical supplies to Cuba. In addition, remittances to
Cubans from Cuban Americans were legalized.' 2' Clinton also resumed hu-
manitarian charter flights of cargo and caregivers directly from the U.S.
Lastly, the President urged Congress to collaborate in developing a biparti-
san approach to easing food shipment restrictions. 22 All of these measures
were directed to helping the Cuban people rather than their dictatorial leader.
"The Cuban people are beginning to look beyond Fidel Castro," explained
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. "We must do the same."'23 Wash-
ington has even begun to soften its diplomatic isolation of Cuba. On April 6,
1998, at a meeting of the Caribbean Community ("Caricom"), Secretary of
State Albright announced that the U.S. would not attempt to dissuade Cari-
com from admitting Cuba to its membership. 24
Even with the continuation of the U.S. economic embargo against
Cuba, Fidel Castro's reign of power is not in immediate jeopardy. Canadian
Prime Minister Jean Chrdtien may have expressed it best in referring to the
embargo against Cuba: "They're just making it possible for Castro to stay in
power, because he has an excuse, he can blame the Americans." '25 Castro's
Marti-esque national hand is further strengthened. The demon to fight, ac-
cording to Castro and his propaganda machine, is still the U.S. imperialist
tendency. The continuing economic crisis has not harmed his popularity.
Through a combination of tactical skills, endurance, and nationalist fervor
that taps into the Cuban people's collective psyche, his leadership goes un-
challenged. 2 6 That the Communist Party is the only legal political party also
120. S. Lynne Walker, Pope's Stirring Appeal for Liberty Electrifies Cubans, S.D.
UNIoN-TRM., Jan. 30, 1998, at A3.
121. While remittances of up to $1200 per family were formally suspended in 1994,
Cuban Americans continued to ignore this rule--to the tune of an estimated $500 to $800
million annually.
122. Tyler Marshall, New Policy on Cuba Will Aim to Aid All but Castro, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1998, at Al.
123. Walter Russell Mead, Remaking U.S.-Cuba Policy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 39, 1998, at
M2.
124. Canute James, Washington Eases Stance Over Cuba, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at
A4.
125. Madeleine Drohan, Chr~tien Blames U.S. for Helping Cuba, THE GLOBE & MAIL,
Jan. 23, 1997, at A13.
126. Even if the political nature of Havana will not change significantly, good reasons
exist to keep in contact with the Castro regime. The resumption of the nuclear power plant
at Juragud, mothballed long ago, is a case in point. To ensure that international nuclear en-
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helps."
On February 24, 1998, Castro was officially reelected President of Cuba
for another five years,"' and, barring ill health, there is every likelihood that
his next administration will outlive that of Bill Clinton's. Accordingly, dia-
logue with Castro's regime is essential to bring Havana into line with the
international community's demands for protection of fundamental political
and human rights on the island.'
But dialogue is not possible under the regime created by the Helms-
Burton Act. Instead, inflexibility has taken the day, for the policy towards
Cuba has been taken out of the President's hands and chiseled into stone. No
U.S. President can lift or even relax the embargo until Fidel Castro and the
existing Cuban regime fall from power. By enshrining into American law
the embargo against Cuba, all forms of flexible diplomacy have been for-
feited. The Helms-Burton Act stipulates that the U.S. economic embargo
can be lifted only when a "transitional government" comes to power in Ha-
vana. To remove all doubt, a transitional government is defined as one that
legalizes all political activity, releases all political prisoners, holds free elec-
tions under international supervision, respects private property, promises to
restore confiscated property to its pre-1959 owners, and excludes Fidel Cas-
tro and his brother, Raiil, Defense Minister and head of the Cuban Armed
Forces.
To facilitate a dialogue between Havana and Washington, the Helms-
Burton Act must be repealed. The Clinton administration must have the
foresight to undertake this challenge bravely. 3 ' Despite the enactment of the
Helms-Burton Act, the world's trading States are doing business in Cuba.
More than 1800 companies from 61 countries participated in a recent trade
fair in Cuba. Many business people are doing business with the Castro re-
gime. It is time that the United States government formally allow its compa-
ergy safety standards are met, the American government should be monitoring the project.
Any nuclear mishap could devastate more than Cuba. As the accident at the Chernobyl nu-
clear plant proved, nuclear waste does not respect territorial boundaries. The project has
already cost more than $1 billion, and requires another $750 million to finish construction.
This project should further entice the U.S. to work with the Cuban government, not against
it. An ounce of prevention could be worth a pound of cure in the event of a nuclear waste
cloud flying over the Florida Straits. Larry Rohter, Cuba's Nuclear Plant Project Worries
Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at A6.
127. Fidel Castro could also do with a lesson on Creative Problem Solving. Unwilling
to compromise, the Cuban President has denounced these measures. From his perspective,
the whole embargo must be lifted, not a few small exceptions legislated into the arduous
regime.
128. Pascal Fletcher, Castro: No to Chastity Belts, No to Cokes, FIN. TiMs, Feb. 26,
1998, at 6.
129. See Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, U.N. Resol. 51/113, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/113 (1997).
130. Mike Clary, Pope's Cuba Visit Fosters Attitude Shift, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1998,
at 14. In the wake of recent public opinion polls showing strong support among Cuban
Americans for the continuation of the embargo, it is unlikely that such a move will occur
soon.
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nies and citizens to do the same.
We have the right to expect more from the Clinton administration dur-
ing its second term. President Clinton has long championed the notion of
global free trade and the dangers that come with trade protectionism. He fa-
vors multilateral and flexible approaches to international problem solving.
President Clinton appreciates the order that following international law can
bring. But the current U.S. policy towards Cuba, as typified by the em-
bargo, violates international law as well as common sense. The United
States should not be punishing Cuba's trading partners, let alone Cuba. In an
era where globalization and the breakdown of borders are commonplace and
trade liberalization is trumpeted, trade embargoes are counterproductive.
Enacting legislation with a view to unseating a foreign leader is more
than bad diplomacy-it is bad politics. Having outlasted eight Presidents-
Bill Clinton being the ninth-Fidel Castro has shown he is a skilled nego-
tiator. Having fought a three-year guerrilla campaign in the Sierra Maestra
mountains and lived through an invasion and various assassination attempts,
he has demonstrated keen survival skills. The harsh results of the economic
embargo have yet to force him to change his regime's policies on funda-
mental human rights. As a bone in the throat of the United States, he has de-
veloped uncanny strategic sense. He is also apparently quite a host, as the
Pope's trip to Cuba showed.
In the days leading up to the Papal visit, Castro invited U.S. President
Bill Clinton to pay a similar visit to Cuba. On Saturday, January 17, 1998,
during a six-hour televised speech to the nation, the Cuban leader challenged
the American President to come to Cuba and to teach the Cuban people
"about capitalism, neo-liberalism and globalization..13. Coincidentally, that
same day President Clinton suspended for the fourth time the implementa-
tion of Title III provisions of the Helms-Burton Act, further stalling the
ability of Cuban exiles (now U.S. nationals) to sue foreign corporations in
U.S. courts for "trafficking" in expropriated property in Cuba.
Maybe it is time for President Clinton to work towards dismantling the
Helms-Burton Act and making travel plans to Cuba. Men more holy than he
have made the pilgrimage. Indeed, the American President has much to learn
from the Pontiff. President Clinton once admitted that "[tihe Pope is a very
persuasive fellow.""13 Mr. Castro could admit the same. Perhaps they can all
learn from each other. But that happens only by talking to each other.
131. Reuters, Castro Mockingly Invites Clinton to Visit Cuba, Jan. 17, 1998, and
United Press International, White House Questions Cuba's Invitation, Jan. 20, 1998.
132. Pascal Fletcher, Cubans Make Light of the First Coming, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 17,
1998, at 3.
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